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TrickBot Now Uses A Windows 10 UAC Bypass To Evade Detection

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TrickBot Now Uses A Windows 10 UAC Bypass To Evade Detection

Update January 17, 2020 - Cyber criminals have released yet another update of TrickBot trojan. It has been implemented with a feature that allows to bypass Windows UAC (User Account Control) and run the malicious executable with administrative privileges, without prompting the user and asking for a permission. Depending on the infiltrated system (Windows 7 or Windows 10), TrickBot uses different methods to bypass the Windows UAC. You can find more information in Bleeping Computer's article written by Lawrence Abrams.

Update January 31, 2020 - TrickBot has started using yet another technique to bypass Windows UAC (User Account Control) and run with administrative privileges without user's consent on computers running Windows 10 operating system. To achieve this, TrickBot now abuses Wsreset (wsreset.exe) - a legitimate Microsoft tool designed to reset Windows Store cache.

In this article, we analyzed tactics, techniques, and procedures utilized by the BlackMatter Ransomware Group to understand their attack methods and the impact of the ransomware. According to our analysis, BlackMatter extensively uses defense evasion techniques to stay under the radar of security controls and achieve their goals. This finding shows that IoC and signature-based approaches would not work against BlackMatter. Reasonable approaches to tackle these threats are behavior-based detection and proactive defense approach with attack simulation and security control validation.

The COM Elevation Moniker enables applications that are running under UAC to activate COM classes (via the following format: Elevation:Administrator!new:guid ) with elevated privileges [10]. The LockBit ransomware also uses the same method to bypass UAC [11].

Windows Defender matches and integrated tightly into the operating system of Windows 10. New techniques are being created by malware writers to evade detection. Like the GoodKit banking Trojan that uses WMIC commands and UAC bypass exclude malware executable from scanning the Windows Defender antivirus.

A GoodKit sample has been recently found by Mr. JamesWT. After thorough analyzing, reverse engineer and malware researcher Mr. Vitali Kremez found the dispersion attempts to bypass detections by the Windows Defender, excluding the part of malware from scanning.

Once the PowerShell process spawns csc.exe, it applies a known bypass method for Anti Malware Scan Interface (AMSI), to sneak past security defenses. Changing the underlying implementation from PowerShell to C# makes the activity less obvious to both humans and detection engines. In particular, it helps hide the AMSI bypass trick and any indicators of compromise (IoCs).

MedusaLocker uses a known UAC bypass technique also used by other malware such as Trickbot that allows the ransomware to run with escalated privileges that enable it to carry out administrative operations. It achieves privilege escalation by leveraging the built-in Windows tool CMSTP.exe to Bypass User Account Control and execute arbitrary commands from a malicious INF through an auto-elevated COM interface. An implementation of that technique can be found on Github:

A lot of the Cobalt Strike post-exploitation tools are implemented as windows DLLs. This means that every time a threat actor runs these built-in tools, Cobalt Strike spawns a temporary process and uses rundll32.exe to inject the malicious code into it and communicates the results back to the beacon using named pipes. Defenders should pay close attention to command line events that rundll32 is executing without any arguments.Example execution:

In order to be stealthier, LockBit ransomware loads its modules dynamically instead of having them hardcoded in the IAT and uses LoadLibraryA. This method is employed to avoid detection by static engines.

One shouldn't really expect these providers to be running in a production system; however, that is not to say that some applications m

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